apprehension nor conscious perception of any thing. In a word, nature is a thing, that hath no such self-perception or self-enjoyment in it, as animals have.

16. Now we are well aware, that this is a thing,, which the narrow principles of some late philosophers will not admit of, that there should be any action distinct from local motion besides expressly conscious cogitation* For they making the first general heads of all entity to be extension and co-gitation, or extended being and cogitative; and then supposing, that the essence of cogitation consists in express consciousness, must needs by this means exclude such a plastic life of nature, as we speak of, that is supposed to act without animal fancy or express consciousness-

Wherefore, we conceive, that the first heads of being ought rather to be expressed thus; resisting or antitypouB extension, and life, (L e. internal energy and self-activity ;) and then again, that life or internaLself-atrtivity is to be subdivided into such as either acts with express consciousness and syn&sthesis, or such as is without it; the latter of which *is* this plastic life of nature : so that there may be an action distinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not accompanied with that %ncy, or consciousness, that is in the energies of the animal life; that is, there may be a simple internal energy, or vital autokinesy, which is without that duplication, that is included in the nature of ww&tog, con-sense and consciousness,—which makes a being to be present with itself, attentive to its own actions, or animadversive of them, to perceive itself to do or suffer, and to have a fruition or en* joyriient of itself. And indeed it must be granted*